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Abstract
Recent developments in differentially private (DP) machine learning and DP
Bayesian learning have enabled learning under strong privacy guarantees for the
training data subjects. In this paper, we further extend the applicability of DP
Bayesian learning by presenting the first general DP Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithm whose privacy-guarantees are not subject to unrealistic assump-
tions on Markov chain convergence and that is applicable to posterior inference
in arbitrary models. Our algorithm is based on a decomposition of the Barker
acceptance test that allows evaluating the Rényi DP privacy cost of the accept-
reject choice. We further show how to improve the DP guarantee through data
subsampling and approximate acceptance tests.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [Dwork et al., 2006, Dwork and Roth, 2014] and its generalisations to
concentrated DP [Dwork and Rothblum, 2016, Bun and Steinke, 2016] and Rényi DP [Mironov,
2017] have recently emerged as the dominant framework for privacy-preserving machine learning.
There are DP versions of many popular machine learning algorithms, including highly popular and
effective DP stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [Song et al., 2013] for optimisation-based learning.
There has also been a fair amount of work in DP Bayesian machine learning, with the proposed
approaches falling to three main categories: i) DP perturbation of sufficient statistics for inference in
exponential family models [e.g. Zhang et al., 2016, Foulds et al., 2016, Park et al., 2016, Bernstein
and Sheldon, 2018], ii) gradient perturbation similar to DP SGD for stochastic gradient Markov chain
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Monte Carlo (MCMC) and variational inference [e.g. Wang et al., 2015, Jälkö et al., 2017, Li et al.,
2019], and iii) DP guarantees for sampling from the exact posterior typically realised using MCMC
[e.g. Dimitrakakis et al., 2014, Zhang et al., 2016, Geumlek et al., 2017].
None of these provide fully general solutions: i) sufficient statistic perturbation methods are limited
to a restricted set of models, ii) stochastic gradient methods lack theoretical convergence guarantees
and are limited to models with continuous variables, iii) posterior sampling methods are applicable to
general models, but the privacy is conditional on exact sampling from the posterior, which is usually
impossible to verify in practice.
In this paper, we present a new generic DP-MCMC method with strict, non-asymptotic privacy
guarantees that hold independently of the chain’s convergence. Our method is based on a recent
Barker acceptance test formulation [Seita et al., 2017].
1.1 Our contribution
We present the first general-purpose DP MCMC method with a DP guarantee under mild assumptions
on the target distribution. We mitigate the privacy loss induced by the basic method through a
subsampling-based approximation. We also improve on the existing method of Seita et al. [2017] for
subsampled MCMC, resulting in a significantly more accurate method for correcting the subsampling
induced noise distribution.
2 Background
2.1 Differential privacy
Definition 1 (Differential privacy). A randomized algorithmM : XN → I satisfies (, δ) differential
privacy, if for all adjacent datasets x,x′ ∈ XN and for all measurable I ⊂ I it holds that
Pr(M(x) ∈ I) ≤ e Pr(M(x′) ∈ I) + δ. (1)
Adjacency here means that |x| = |x′|, and x differs from x′ by a single element, e.g. by a single row
corresponding to one individual’s data in a data matrix.
Recently Mironov [2017] proposed a Rényi divergence [Rényi, 1961] based relaxation for differential
privacy called Rényi differential privacy (RDP).
Definition 2 (Rényi divergence). Rényi divergence between two distributions P and Q defined over
I is defined as
Dα(P ||Q) = 1
α− 1 logEP
[(
p(X)
q(X)
)α−1]
. (2)
Definition 3 (Rényi differential privacy). A randomized algorithmM : XN → I is (α, )-RDP, if
for all adjacent datasets x,x′ it holds that
Dα(M(x) ||M(x′)) ≤  ∆= (α). (3)
Like DP, RDP has many useful properties such as invariance to post-processing. The main advantage
of RDP compared to DP is the theory providing tight bounds for doing adaptive compositions, i.e.,
for combining the privacy losses from several possibly adaptive mechanisms accessing the same
data, and subsampling [Wang et al., 2019]. RDP guarantees can always be converted to (, δ)-DP
guarantees. These existing results are presented in detail in the Supplement.
2.2 Subsampled MCMC using Barker acceptance
The fundamental idea in standard MCMC methods [Brooks et al., 2011] is that a distribution pi(θ)
that can only be evaluated up to a normalising constant, is approximated by samples θ1, . . . , θt
drawn from a suitable Markov chain. Denoting the current parameter values by θ, the next value is
generated using a proposal θ′ drawn from a proposal distribution q(θ′|θ). An acceptance test is used
to determine if the chain should move to the proposed value or stay at the current one.
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Denoting the acceptance probability by α(θ′, θ), a test that satisfies detailed balance
pi(θ)q(θ′|θ)α(θ′, θ) = pi(θ′)q(θ|θ′)α(θ, θ′) together with ergodicity of the chain are sufficient condi-
tions to guarantee asymptotic convergence to the correct invariant distribution pi(θ). In Bayesian infer-
ence, we are typically interested in sampling from the posterior distribution, i.e., pi(θ) ∝ p(x|θ)p(θ).
However, it is computationally infeasible to use e.g. the standard Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) test
[Metropolis et al., 1953, Hastings, 1970] with large datasets, since each iteration would require
evaluating p(x|θ).
To solve this problem in the non-private setting, Seita et al. [2017] formulate an approximate test that
only uses a fraction of the data at each iteration. In the rest of this Section we briefly rephrase their
arguments most relevant for our approach without too much details. A more in-depth treatment is
then presented in deriving DP MCMC in Section 3.
We start by assuming the data are exchangeable, so p(x|θ) = ∏xi∈x p(xi|θ). Let
∆(θ′, θ) =
∑
xi∈x
log
p(xi|θ′)
p(xi|θ) + log
p(θ′)q(θ|θ′)
p(θ)q(θ′|θ) , (4)
where we suppress the parameters for brevity in the following, and let Vlog ∼ Logistic(0, 1). Instead
of using the standard M-H acceptance probability min{exp(∆), 1}, Seita et al. [2017] use a form of
Barker acceptance test [Barker, 1965] to show that testing if
∆ + Vlog > 0 (5)
also satisfies detailed balance. To ease the computational burden, we now want to use only a random
subset S ⊂ x of size b instead of full data of size N to evaluate acceptance. Let
∆∗(θ′, θ) =
N
b
∑
xi∈S
log
p(xi|θ′)
p(xi|θ) + log
p(θ′)q(θ|θ′)
p(θ)q(θ′|θ) . (6)
Omitting the parameters again, ∆∗ is now an unbiased estimator for ∆, and assuming xi are iid
samples from the data distribution, ∆∗ has approximately normal distribution by the Central Limit
Theorem (CLT).
In order to have a test that approximates the exact full data test (5), we decompose the logistic noise
as Vlog ' Vnorm + Vcor, where Vnorm has a normal distribution and Vcor is a suitable correction.
Relying on the CLT and on this decomposition we write ∆∗+Vcor ' ∆+Vnorm+Vcor ' ∆+Vlog,
so given the correction we can approximate the full data exact test using a minibatch.
2.3 Tempering
When the sample size N is very large, one general problem in Bayesian inference is that the posterior
includes more and more details. This often leads to models that are much harder to interpret while
only marginally more accurate than simpler models (see e.g. Miller and Dunson 2019). One way
of addressing this issue is to scale the log-likelihood ratios in (4) and (6), so instead of log p(xi|θ)
we would have τ log p(xi|θ) with some τ. The effect of scaling with 0 < τ < 1 is then to spread the
posterior mass more evenly. We will refer to this scaling as tempering.
As an interesting theoretical justification for tempering, Miller and Dunson [2019] show a relation
between tempered likelihoods and modelling error. The main idea is to take the error between the
theoretical pure data and the actual observable data into account in the modelling. Denote the observed
data with lowercase and errorless random variables with uppercase letters, and let R ∼ Exp(β). Then
using empirical KL divergence as our modelling error estimator dN , instead of the standard posterior
we are looking for the posterior conditional on the observed data being close to the pure data, i.e., we
want p(θ|dN (x1:N , X1:N ) < R), which is called coarsened posterior or c-posterior.
Miller and Dunson [2019] show that with these assumptions
p(θ|dN (x1:N , X1:N ) < R) ∝∼ p(x|θ)ξN p(θ), (7)
where∝∼means approximately proportional to, and ξN = 1/(1+N/β), i.e., a posterior with tempered
likelihoods can be interpreted as an approximate c-posterior.
3
3 Privacy-preserving MCMC
Our aim is to sample from the posterior distribution of the model parameters while ensuring dif-
ferential privacy. We start in Section 3.2 by formulating DP MCMC based on the exact full data
Barker acceptance presented in Section 2.2. To improve on this basic algorithm, we then introduce
subsampling in Section 3.3. The resulting DP subsampled MCMC algorithm has significantly better
privacy guarantees as well as computational requirements than the full data version.
3.1 Notation
There are multiple different factors that we use in the privacy analysis. Table 1 includes all the
necessary factors used.
Notation Explanation
α Parameter for RDP
T Number of MCMC draws
N Dataset size
C ∈ (0, pi2/3) Noise variance, in Section 3.3 we set C = 2
B Assumed bound for the log-likelihood ratios (llr) w.r.t. data OR the parameters
b > 5α Batch size for subsampled DP-MCMC
β Parameter for tempering
Table 1: Table of the notation used in Section 3.
3.2 DP MCMC
To achieve privacy-preserving MCMC, we repurpose the decomposition idea mentioned in Section 2.2
with subsampling, i.e., we decompose Vlog in the exact test (5) into normal and correction variables.
Noting that Vlog has variance pi2/3, fix 0 < C < pi2/3 a constant and write
Vlog ' N (0, C) + V (C)cor , (8)
where V (C)cor is the correction with variance pi2/3− C. Now testing if
N (∆, C) + V (C)cor > 0 (9)
is approximately equivalent to (5).
Since (8) holds exactly for no known distribution V (C)cor with an analytical expression, Seita et al.
[2017] construct an approximation by discretising the convolution implicit in (8), and turning the
problem into a ridge regression problem which can be solved easily. Unlike Seita et al. [2017], we
aim for preserving privacy. We therefore want to work with relatively large values of C for which the
ridge regression based solution does not give a good approximation. Instead, we propose to use a
Gaussian mixture model approximation, which gives good empirical performance for larger C as
well. The details of the approximation with related discussion can be found in the Supplement.
In practice, if V (C)cor is an approximation, the stationary distribution of the chain might not be the
exact posterior. However, when the approximation (8) is good, the accept-reject decisions are rarely
affected and we can expect to stay close to the true posterior. Clearly, in the limit of decreasing C we
recover the exact test (5). We return to this topic in Section 3.3.
Considering privacy, on each MCMC iteration we access the data only through the log-likelihood
ratio ∆ in the test (9). To achieve RDP, we therefore need a bound for the Rényi divergence between
two Gaussians Nx = N (∆x, C) and Nx′ = N (∆x′ , C) corresponding to neighbouring datasets
x,x′. The following Lemma states the Rényi divergence between two Gaussians:
Lemma 1. Rényi divergence between two normals N1 and N2 with parameters µ1, σ1 and µ2, σ2
respectively is
Dα(N1 || N2) = ln σ2
σ1
+
1
2(α− 1) ln
σ22
σ2α
+
α
2
(µ1 − µ2)2
σ2α
, (10)
where σ2α = ασ
2
2 + (1− α)σ21 .
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Proof. See [Gil et al., 2013] Table 2.
Theorem 1. Assume either
| log p(xi | θ′)− log p(xi | θ)| ≤ B (11)
or
| log p(xi | θ)− log p(xj | θ)| ≤ B, (12)
for all xi, xj and for all θ, θ′. Releasing a result of the accept/reject decision from the test (9) is
(α, )-RDP with  = 2αB2/C.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1. See Supplement for further details.
Using the composition property of RDP (see Supplement), it is straightforward to get the following
Corollary for the whole chain:
Corollary 1. Releasing an MCMC chain of T iterations, where at each iteration the accept-reject
decision is done using the test (9), satisfies (α, ′)-RDP with ′ = T2αB2/C.
We can satisfy the condition (11) with sufficiently smooth likelihoods and a proposal distribution
with a bounded domain:
Lemma 2. Assuming the model log-likelihoods are L-Lipschitz over θ and the diameter of the
proposal distribution domain is bounded by dθ, LHS of (11) is bounded by Ldθ.
Proof.
|log p(xi | θ)− log p(xi | θ′)| ≤ L|θ − θ′| ≤ Ldθ. (13)
Clearly, when Ldθ ≤ B we satisfy the condition in Equation (11).
For some models, using a proposal distribution with a bounded domain could affect the ergodicity of
the chain. Considering models that are not Lipschitz or using an unbounded proposal distribution,
we can also satisfy the boundedness condition (11) by clipping the log-likelihood ratios to a suitable
interval.
3.3 DP subsampled MCMC
In Section 3.2 we showed that we can release samples from the MCMC algorithm under privacy
guarantees. However, as already discussed, evaluating the log-likelihood ratios might require too
much computation with large datasets. Using the full dataset in the DP MCMC setting might also be
infeasible for privacy reasons: the noise variance C in Theorem 1 is upper-bounded by the variance
of the logistic random variable, and thus working under a strict privacy budget we might be able to
run the chain for only a few iterations before ′ in Corollary 1 exceeds our budget. Using only a
subsample S of the data at each MCMC iteration allows us to reduce not only the computational cost
but also the privacy cost through privacy amplification [Wang et al., 2019].
As stated in Section 2.2, for the subsampled variant according to the CLT we have
∆∗ = ∆ + V˜norm, (14)
where V˜norm is approximately normal with some variance σ2∆∗ . Assuming
σ2∆∗ < C < pi
2/3 (15)
for some constant C, we now reformulate the decomposition (8) as
Vlog ' Vnorm + Vnc︸ ︷︷ ︸
∼N (0,C)
+ V (C)cor , (16)
where Vnorm ∼ N (0, σ2∆∗) and Vnc ∼ N (0, C − σ2∆∗). We can now write
∆∗ + Vnc + V (C)cor ' ∆ + Vnorm + Vnc + V (C)cor ' ∆ + Vlog, (17)
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where the first approximation is justified by the CLT, and the second by the decomposition (16).
Therefore, testing if
N (∆∗, C − σ2∆∗) + V (C)cor > 0 (18)
approximates the exact full data test (5).
As in Section 3.2, the approximations used for arriving at the test (18) imply that the stationary
distribution of the chain need not be the exact posterior. However, we can expect to stay close to
the true posterior when the approximations are good, since the result only changes if the binary
accept-reject decision is affected. This is exemplified by the testing in Section 4 (see also Seita et al.
2017). The quality of the first approximation in (17) depends on the batch size b, which should not
be too small. As for the second error source, as already noted in Section 3.2 we markedly improve
on this with the GMM based approximation, and the resulting error is typically very small (see
Supplement). In some cases there are known theoretical upper bounds for the total error w.r.t. the
true posterior. These bounds are of limited practical value since they rely on assumptions that can be
hard to meet in general, and we therefore defer them to the Supplement.
For privacy, similarly as in Section 3.2, in (18) we need to access the data only for calculating
∆∗ + Vnc. Thus, it suffices to privately release a sample from NS = N (∆∗x, C − s2∆∗x), where
s2∆∗x denotes the sample variance when sampling from dataset x, i.e., we need to bound the Rényi
divergence between NS and NS′ . We use noise variance C = 2 in the following analysis.
Next, we will state our main theorem giving an explicit bound that can be used for calculating the
privacy loss for a single MCMC iteration with subsampling:
Theorem 2. Assuming
|log p(xi|θ′)− log p(xi|θ)| ≤
√
b
N
, (19)
α <
b
5
, (20)
where b is the size of the minibatch S and N is the dataset size, releasing a sample from NS satisfies
(α, )-RDP with
 =
5
2b
+
1
2(α− 1) ln
2b
b− 5α +
2α
b− 5α. (21)
Proof. The idea of the proof is straightforward: we need to find an upper bound for each of the terms
in Lemma 1, which can be done using standard techniques. Note that for C = 2, (19) implies that the
variance assumption (15) holds. See Supplement for the full derivation.
Using the composition [Mironov, 2017] and subsampling amplification [Wang et al., 2019] properties
of Rényi DP (see Supplement), we immediately get the following:
Corollary 2. Releasing a chain of T subsampled MCMC iterations with sampling ratio q, each
satisfying (α, (α))-RDP with (α) from Theorem 2, is (α, T′)-RDP with
′ =
1
α− 1 log
(
1 + q2
(
α
2
)
min{4(e(2) − 1), 2e(2)}+ 2
α∑
j=3
qj
(
α
j
)
e(j−1)(j)
)
. (22)
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) illustrate how changing the parameters q and T in Corollary 2 will affect the
privacy budget of DP MCMC.
Similarly as in the full data case in Section 3.2, we can satisfy the condition (19) with sufficiently
smooth likelihoods or by clipping. Figure 1(c) shows how frequently we need to clip the log-
likelihood ratios to maintain the bound in (19) as a function of proposal variance using a Gaussian
mixture model problem defined in Section 4. Using smaller proposal variance will result in smaller
changes in the log-likelihoods between the previous and the proposed parameter values, which entails
fewer clipped values.
However, the bound in (19) gets tighter with increasing N . To counterbalance this, either the
proposals need to be closer to the current value (assuming suitably smooth log-likelihood), resulting
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Figure 1: Parameter effects. Calculating total privacy budget from Corollary 2 for different dataset
sizes: in Figure 1(a) as a function of subsampling ratio, and in Figure 1(b) as a function of number of
iterations. Figure 1(c) shows the proportion of clipped log-likelihood ratios as a function of proposal
variance for the GMM example detailed in Section 4.
in a slower mixing chain, or b needs to increase, affecting privacy amplification. For very large N we
would therefore like to temper the log-likelihood ratios in a way that we could use sufficiently small
batches to benefit from privacy amplification, while still preserving sufficient amount of information
from the likelihoods and reasonable mixing properties. Using the c-posterior discussed in Section 2.3
with parameter β s.t. N0 = Nβ/(β +N), instead of condition (19) we then require
|log p(xi|θ′)− log p(xi|θ)| ≤
√
b
N0
, (23)
which does not depend on N.
4 Experiments
In order to demonstrate our proposed method in practice, we use a simple 2-dimensional Gaussian
mixture model2, that has been used by Welling and Teh [2011] and Seita et al. [2017] in the non-private
setting:
θj ∼ N (0, σ2j , ), j = 1, 2 (24)
xi ∼ 0.5 · N (θ1, σ2x) + 0.5 · N (θ1 + θ2, σ2x), (25)
where σ21 = 10, σ
2
2 = 1, σ
2
x = 2. For the observed data, we use fixed parameter values θ = (0, 1).
Following Seita et al. [2017], we generate 106 samples from the model to use as training data. We
use b = 1000 for the minibatches, and adjust the temperature of the chain s.t. N0 = 100 in (23). This
corresponds to the temperature used by Seita et al. [2017] in their non-private test.
If we have absolutely no idea of a good initial range for the parameter values, especially in higher
dimensions the chain might waste the privacy budget in moving towards areas with higher posterior
probability. In such cases we might want to initialise the chain in at least somewhat reasonable
location, which will cost additional privacy. To simulate this effect, we use the differentially private
variational inference (DPVI) introduced by Jälkö et al. [2017] with a small privacy budget (0.22, 10−6)
to find a rough estimate for the initial location.
As shown in Figure 2, the samples from the tempered chain with DP are nearly indistinguishable
from the samples drawn from the non-private tempered chain. We also compared our method against
DP stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics (DP SGLD) method of Li et al. [2019]. Figure 3 illustrates
how the accuracy is affected by privacy. Posterior means and variances are computed from the first t
iterations of the private chain alongside the privacy cost , which increases with t. The baseline is
given by a non-private chain after 40000 iterations. The plots show the mean and the standard error
of the mean over 20 runs of 20 000 iterations with DP MCMC and 6 000 000 with DP SGLD. The DP
MCMC method was burned in for 1 000 iterations and DP SGLD for 100 000 iterations.
2The code for running all the experiments is avalaible in https://github.com/DPBayes/
DP-MCMC-NeurIPS2019.
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are very close to the non-private results.
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Figure 3: Intermediate private posterior statistics from DP SGLD and DP MCMC compared against
the baseline given by a non-private chain after 40000 iterations. Lines showing the mean error
between 20 runs of the algorithm with errorbars illustrating the standard error of the mean between
the runs. DP SGDL converges quickly towards the posterior mean, but does not properly capture
posterior variance.
5 Related work
Bayesian posterior sampling under DP has been studied using several different approaches. Recently
Yıldırım and Ermis¸ [2019] proposed a method for drawing samples from exact posterior under DP
using a modified MH algorithm. However their solution does not include subsampling and thus
suffers the computational cost of the full likelihood. Dimitrakakis et al. [2014] note that drawing
a single sample from the posterior distribution of a model where the log-likelihood is Lipschitz or
bounded yields a DP guarantee. The bound on  can be strengthened by tempering the posterior by
raising the likelihood to a power τ ∈ (0, 1) to obtain the tempered posterior
piτ (θ) ∝ p(θ)p(x | θ)τ . (26)
The same principle is discussed and extended by Wang et al. [2015], Zhang et al. [2016] and
Dimitrakakis et al. [2017] in the classical DP setting and by Geumlek et al. [2017] in the RDP setting.
Wang et al. [2015] dub this the “one posterior sample” (OPS) mechanism. The main limitation of
all these methods is that the privacy guarantee is conditional on sampling from the exact posterior,
which is in most realistic cases impossible to verify.
The other most widely used approach for DP Bayesian inference is perturbation of sufficient statistics
of an exponential family model using the Laplace mechanism. This straightforward application of the
Laplace mechanism was mentioned at least by Dwork and Smith [2009] and has been widely applied
since by several authors [e.g. Zhang et al., 2016, Foulds et al., 2016, Park et al., 2016, Honkela
et al., 2018, Bernstein and Sheldon, 2018]. In particular, Foulds et al. [2016] show that the sufficient
statistics perturbation is more efficient than OPS for models where both are applicable. Furthermore,
these methods can provide an unconditional privacy guarantee. Many of the early methods ignore the
Laplace noise injected for DP in the inference, leading to potentially biased inference results. This
weakness is addressed by Bernstein and Sheldon [2018], who include the uncertainty arising from
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the injected noise in the modelling, which improves especially the accuracy of posterior variances for
models where this can be done.
MCMC methods that use gradient information such as Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) and various
stochastic gradient MCMC methods have become popular recently. DP variants of these were first
proposed by Wang et al. [2015] and later refined by Li et al. [2019] to make use of the moments
accountant [Abadi et al., 2016]. The form of the privacy guarantee for these methods is similar to
that of our method: there is an unconditional guarantee for models with a differentiable Lipschitz
log-likelihood that weakens as more iterations are taken. Because of the use of the gradients, these
methods are limited to differentiable models and cannot be applied to e.g. models with discrete
variables.
Before Seita et al. [2017], the problem of MCMC without using the full data has been considered
by many authors (see Bardenet et al. 2017 for a recent literature survey). The methods most closely
related to ours are the ones by Korattikara et al. [2014] and Bardenet et al. [2014]. From our
perspective, the main problem with these approaches is the adaptive batch size: the algorithms may
regularly need to use all observations on a single iteration [Seita et al., 2017], which clashes with
privacy amplification. Bardenet et al. [2017] have more recently proposed an improved version of
their previous technique alleviating the problem, but the batch sizes can still be large for privacy
amplification.
6 Discussion
While gradient-based samplers such as HMC are clearly dominant in the non-DP case, it is unclear
how useful they will be under DP. Straightforward stochastic gradient methods such as stochastic
gradient Langevin dynamics (SGLD) can be fast in initial convergence to a high posterior density
region, but it is not clear if they can explore that region more efficiently. We can see this in Figure 3:
the gradient adjusted method rapidly converges close to posterior mean, but the posterior variance is
not captured. HMC does have a clear advantage at exploration, but Betancourt [2015] demonstrates
that HMC is very sensitive to having accurate gradients and therefore a naive DP HMC is unlikely to
perform well. We believe that using a gradient-based method such as DP variational inference [Jälkö
et al., 2017] as an initiasation for the proposed method can yield overall a very efficient sampler that
can take advantage of the gradients in the initial convergence and of MCMC in obtaining accurate
posterior variances. Further work in benchmarking different approaches over a number of models is
needed, but it is beyond the scope of this work.
The proposed method allows for structurally new kind of assumptions to guarantee privacy through
forcing bounds on the proposal instead of or in addition to the likelihood. This opens the door for a
lot of optimisation in the design of the proposal. It is not obvious how the proposal should be selected
in order to maximise the amount of useful information obtained about the posterior under the given
privacy budget, when one has to balance between sampler acceptance rate and autocorrelation as well
as privacy. We leave this interesting question for future work.
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